EU Sports Regulation After Super League

Scholar argues that Super League may lead to misguided regulation of European football through antitrust law.

“You greedy bastards, you are ruining our club!”

That was according to the thousands of supporters assembled outside of Chelsea F.C.’s stadium in April 2021 protesting the club’s announcement that it would join the recently announced Super League—a proposed international football competition comprising mostly highly lucrative clubs.

European politicians, including former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and French President Emmanuel Macron, voiced their support for the protests, stating they would do everything in their power to block the Super League.

Despite vocal opposition from major European leaders, the European Court of Justice ruled in December 2023 that attempts by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)—the European football governing authority—to block the creation of the Super League violated European Union antitrust laws. The decision has left some fans wondering what the future holds for football and the EU.

The Super League v. UEFA decision marks a sea change in EU sports regulation, argues Jan Zglinski of the London School of Economics in a recent working paper. Zglinski claims that Super League changes the EU’s approach to regulating football by treating it as a predominantly economic activity. By doing so, Super League both requires greater transparency from UEFA and provides a precedent for future sports policy interventions by EU regulators through EU competition law, according to Zglinski.

Although Super League may allow for much-needed oversight from EU regulators, Zglinski ultimately concludes that EU competition law cannot address the biggest problems facing international football.

The organizers of the Super League proposed the competition to European football clubs as an alternative international competition to the Champions League—the international competition currently organized by the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and UEFA. Participation in international competitions such as the Champions League produces significant profits for football clubs, Zglinski observes, so the opportunity to participate in the Super League attracted many lucrative teams such as Liverpool F.C. and Real Madrid.

Fans and politicians, however, rebelled against the Super League. Unlike the Champions League, in which clubs may only participate if they meet certain performance criteria in their domestic leagues, many highly lucrative clubs would have been guaranteed participation in the Super League regardless of domestic performance. The fan backlash to this lack of meritocracy caused every club slated to participate in the Super League to pull out within 48 hours of its announcement.

Prior to its collapse, Super League organizers filed suit in the EU courts asking them to strike down UEFA regulations preventing clubs from participating in competitions not sanctioned by UEFA. The litigation proceeded to the European Court of Justice in 2023 despite the collapse of the Super League over two years earlier.

The Court of Justice held in Super League that Section 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—which states that the EU should favor the growth of sports—did not give UEFA or other football governing bodies the ability to exercise anticompetitive control over the economic aspects of sporting competitions, observes Zglinski. These economic regulations included rules over hosting competitions and rules restricting players switching clubs, claims Zglinski. He argues that although the Court of Justice made sure to affirm UEFA’s ability to govern the non-economic aspects of the game—such as the rules of play—it emphasized that UEFA could not act as a monopolist.

The Court of Justice ultimately concluded, according to Zglinski, that because current UEFA rules allowed it to block a club from participating in any competition not sanctioned by UEFA, the rules violated EU competition law by giving UEFA an effective monopoly over matches.

Zglinski argues that the Super League decision will not have a significant short-term impact because the Super League has already collapsed.

Super League will, however, affect EU sports regulation moving forward, Zglinski claims. Although EU courts had previously imposed regulations on sports as economic activities, the Court of Justice in Super League changed course by offering UEFA no deference in creating regulations for economic activity, according to Zglinski.

Zglinski concludes that Super League will have two important consequences moving forward.

First, by eliminating UEFA’s ability to regulate the economic aspects of football, Super League weakens international and national sports governing bodies, claims Zglinski. Although these bodies may retain authority over rules of the game, Super League offers an opportunity for private equity firms and other business interests to intervene in football and other European sports, according to Zglinski.

Second, Zglinski argues that Super League provides a precedent for EU courts looking to police sports more aggressively moving forward. Zglinski observes that fans and politicians alike have called for greater regulation of football due to growing economic disparities between clubs and scandals such as the Super League. Super League provides policymakers a policy lever—EU competition law—to effect this change, Zglinski claims.

Zglinski concludes, however, that regulating football through EU competition law is misguided. Zglinski argues that some of football’s biggest challenges, such as gender equity concerns and sexual harassment, are not economic problems under the EU’s approach in Super League. EU competition law primarily acts to remove barriers to trade and commerce, claims Zglinski, not create regulations designed to address gender issues.

Furthermore, EU competition law primarily focuses on efficiency gains and consumer welfare, observes Zglinski. He argues that this focus may prove counterproductive for regulating sports—endeavors that inherently focus on a variety of non-financial goals such as education, health, and social issues. Although EU competition law could facilitate greater financial competition, it seems ill-suited to regulating something as culturally distinct as sports for the European public, according to Zglinski.

Zglinski ultimately concludes that rather than relying on courts applying competition law to address the growing problems facing football, EU policymakers should create enact legislation tailored specifically to the problems facing football fans and clubs alike.