Richard L. Revesz

Richard L. Revesz is the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget. Professor Revesz also previously served as the Dean of the New York University School of Law. His work focuses on the use of cost-benefit analysis, the allocation of regulatory responsibility in a federal system, and the design of liability regimes

Structural Reforms to Improve Cost-Benefit Analyses of Financial Regulation

Structural Reforms to Improve Cost-Benefit Analyses of Financial Regulation

Independent agencies should mirror executive branch practices to overcome judicial scrutiny.

An Empirical Analysis of the Establishment of Independent Agencies

An Empirical Analysis of the Establishment of Independent Agencies

A divided government may not fully explain the creation of agencies not directly controllable by the President.

The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air Act

The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air Act

Scholars examine the history and consequences of the Clear Air Act’s exemption of existing industrial facilities.

The False Dichotomy of Agency Independence

The False Dichotomy of Agency Independence

Different agency design choices result in a continuum of independence.

The Anti-Capture Justification for Regulatory Review

The Anti-Capture Justification for Regulatory Review

Better understanding of OIRA’s role – and its rationale – provides a new agenda for reform.